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The Improbability of Meaningful Climate
Change Regulation: A Constructivist
Understanding of the Global Commons and
the Need for U.S. Leadership
By Stacey Valentine
Abstract
Climate change is a topic that permeates today’s scientific, political,
and social discourse. It is a term that is both widely known and hotly
debated across the country and across the globe. While an ever-increasing
majority of the scientific and political realms has come to the conclusion
that meaningful climate change regulation is necessary to prevent negative
repercussions across the globe, there is little consensus on what that
regulation should look like or how to bring it about.
The nature of greenhouse gases, or GHGs, makes international
cooperation a must if the world hopes to prevent and avoid the experts’
predictions of widespread negative environmental effects. Because each
state only incurs a fraction of the total cost of its own emissions, as GHGs
act on a global rather than regional scale, the emission of GHGs has
created a tragedy of the commons: each state has an incentive to overuse,
even though the optimal solution is for each and every state to limit its
emissions. States acting in their own best interests will therefore continue
to emit GHGs unless they can be sure that all other states will agree to and
adhere to meaningful regulation.
In the abstract, this solution seems simple enough: in order to prevent
the negative effects associated with climate change, all states must agree to
limit emissions and each state must be assured that all other states will not
defect. However, on the international level where each state is sovereign,
there is no enforcement mechanism to guarantee that states refrain from
defecting. Therefore, in order for GHG regulation to succeed, there must
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be some mechanism by which the incentive to defect is replaced by an
incentive to cooperate.
In order to determine what type of mechanism is most appropriate for
the regulation of climate change, one must examine the international
system to understand how and why states act as they do. While it is
generally assumed that states act in their own best interests, many theorists
believe that these interests are shaped and informed by social and cultural
norms. According to this understanding, it is possible to influence state
behavior by changing the social and cultural norms of international
society. As applied to the issue at hand, this means that the incentive to
defect might be transformed into an incentive to cooperate if the social and
cultural rules require states to cooperate when it comes to GHG emissions.
Scientists predict that time is running out for meaningful regulation,
and that absent some drastic change GHG emissions will create a negative
feedback loop in which the negative effects of climate change will become
unstoppable. If the world hopes to change this outcome, one or more states
must adopt meaningful climate change regulation and hope that in so doing
they will be able to affect the social and cultural norms of international
society, thereby incentivizing states to cooperate rather than defect on
GHG emission regulation.
This Note suggests that the optimal state to take this leadership role is
the United States. Still, even if the U.S. were to take this role beginning
tomorrow, its chances of success remain dismal. Essentially, it must race
against the clock to change the norms of international society, while
incurring the costs of GHG regulation, and hope that such actions will lead
to international cooperation. While the U.S. may determine that this slight
chance of success is not worth the cost, absent the strong leadership of one
or more countries actively advocating for all states to adopt GHG
emissions regulation, meaningful climate change regulation is a hopeless
endeavor.
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Introduction

The majority of today‘s scientific and political worlds generally agree
that meaningful climate change regulation is not only beneficial, but
necessary if the world hopes to avoid short and long term negative
repercussions affecting the environment and in turn the way we live.1 Due
to the nature of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and the general causes of climate
change, any regulation that is soon enough and drastic enough requires
universal cooperation of the major emitters and widespread cooperation
around the globe.2 In other words, it requires that all states agree.
The agreement of the entire world is particularly difficult due to
national sovereignty—the principle that each state gets to make its own
decisions and cannot be bound internationally absent its own consent.3
Assuming that states act rationally in making such decisions, one might
conclude that a state will choose to cooperate with other nations only when
it is within that state‘s own best interests, or at least perceived best
interests.4
The emission of GHGs creates a tragedy of the commons problem.5
Because each state only has to absorb a fraction of the total cost of its own
emissions, due to the fact that emissions act on a global rather than regional
scale, there is an incentive for states to emit greater rather than lesser
amounts of GHGs.6 In order to avoid this problem and reach the optimal
international emissions levels, all states must agree.7 However, since there
are no enforcing mechanisms on the international level due to national
sovereignty,8 voluntary state consent is necessary. In the global commons,
each nation has an incentive to defect, thereby capitalizing on the reduced
emissions of other countries while avoiding the costs of capping their own
emissions.9 Absent some kind of outside influence, these incentives to
defect will ensure that meaningful cooperation is never realized.
In order to identify ways in which to create information and
motivations that will enable states to avoid the tragedy of the commons, one
must first adopt a general lens through which to view state action.10 For
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Infra Part II.
Infra Part II.
Infra Part III.
Infra Part IV.
Infra Part V.
Infra Part V.
Infra Part V.
Infra Part III.
Infra Part V.
Infra Part VI.
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reasons justified within this work, the international relations lens of
constructivism is most conducive to our current purposes.11 This theory
says that while states do act in their own best interest, these preferences and
choices are shaped and informed by social and cultural norms.12 Several
examples of international cooperation do exist, showing that where other
motivations come into play, meaningful regulation is possible.13
Currently, states are not agreeing to high enough and specific enough
emissions standards.14 Based on the following analysis, if the world hopes
to address this problem before it is too late, it must find a way to create
social and cultural motivations to climate change that go beyond those
already in place. There are three primary ways that this might happen. The
first is naturally: however this slow paced option is less than optimal,
particularly when scientific estimates predict that regulation is time
sensitive. The second way nations will change their preferences is in
reaction to some crisis—in this case the drastic changes in climate predicted
as a result of continuing GHG emissions. The problem of course with this
option is that once GHG emissions reach a certain level, they will create a
"feedback loop "at which point any actions taken by states will have limited
effectiveness because these past emissions will have committed the globe to
some degree of warming.15
The third and final option is that one or more states adopt meaningful
climate change regulation as an interest integral to their identity and hence
lead the way in shaping the interactions of states at the international level,
thereby encouraging regulation. The obvious candidate for this job is the
United States, but the U.S. must decide whether it wants to absorb the costs
and risks associated with being such a leader.16
What this analysis generally means is that climate change regulation at
the international level is highly unlikely, even in the best scenario. While
the use of a constructivist lens provides some hope, it is improbable that
regulation will occur and absent strong leadership from a country like the
United States, it becomes practically impossible.17

11.
12.
13.
14.

Infra Part VIII.
Infra Part VIII.
Infra Part IX.
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 66–67 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC] (estimating the emissions trajectories
needed for stabilization).
15. See infra note 22 and accompanying text (supporting the possibility of a feedback
loop).
16. Infra Part X.
17. Infra Part X.
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Background on Global Climate Change

Global climate change regulation is an increasingly important topic of
international law.18 Today, there is general agreement around the world
that the earth‘s climate is changing, that these changes are a result of human
activity and that they are occurring at faster rates and with greater impacts
than first estimated; and as a result most scientists agree that immediate
action is required to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.19 However,
agreement on what exactly that action should look like has yet to be
meaningfully realized.
Scientists have noted a variety of effects resulting from climate change
that are currently identifiable. Generally, these findings show that the
earth‘s climate is warmer that it has ever been in the past 500 years, and
many scientists argue that it is probable that these temperatures surpass
averages from as far back as the last 1,000 years.20 Over the past one
hundred years, average temperatures have generally increased and the
climate as a whole has become increasingly extreme.21
Scientists also predict that the effects of climate change, particularly
absent meaningful regulation of emissions, will continue to affect the
earth‘s climate in a variety of ways.22 One of the most striking effects cited
by scientists is the potential for steadily increasing temperatures.23 At some
18. See CHRIS WOLD, DAVID HUNTER & MELISSA POWERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE
LAW 2 (LexisNexis 2009) ("Climate change refers to the response of the planet‘s climate
system to altered concentrations of . . . ‗greenhouse gases‘ in the atmosphere. If all else is
held constant . . . increased concentrations of greenhouse gases lead to ‗global warming‘—
an increase in global average temperatures—and associated changes in the earth‘s climate
patterns.").
19. See, e.g., WOLD ET AL., supra note 18, at 2 (arguing that these findings are no
longer refuted except by a handful of "climate skeptics," and that the debate now centers not
on whether humans are causing the observed changes in climate but what the effects of this
impact will be and the most effective means of addressing it).
20. See IPCC, supra note 14, at 30 (laying out these observations); see also CLIFFORD
RECHTSCHAFFEN, EILEEN GAUNA & CATHERINE A. O‘NEILL, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW
POLICY & REGULATION 390 (Carolina Academic Press 2009) (summarizing the IPCC report).
21. See IPCC, supra note 14, at 31, Fig. 1 (depicting the upward trend in temperature);
see also RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 390–91 (finding average temperatures
increased 1.33 degrees Fahrenheit over the past 100 years, cold days and nights have
decreased, level four or five hurricanes have increased by 75% since 1970, and eleven of the
twelve years between 1995 and 2006 were among the 12 warmest in the past 150 years).
22. See generally IPCC, supra note 14, at 48–54 (laying out the impacts of climate
change in the near and long term); see also PHILIP WEINBERG & KEVIN A. REILLY,
UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 426 (LexisNexis 2008) (citing effects including a
rise in sea level, coastal flooding, a loss of forests, increased and more volatile storms,
increased desertification, and melting polar ice cap).
23. See, e.g., IPCC, supra note 14, at 46 (charting the predicted increases in
temperature); see also WEINBERG & REILLY supra note 22, at 426–27 (predicting that the
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point, absent meaningful reductions in GHG emissions, scientists anticipate
an unstoppable "feedback loop" at which point our actions will be unable to
have a great impact on the rate of global warming because our past
emissions have already committed us to some degree of warming.24 In fact,
some scientists have argued that if the earth continues to emit at its current
rate, at least some of the effects on global climate will be irreversible by
2030.25 This increase in temperature is problematic, despite the fact that it
seems to be only a few degrees, because even slight changes can cause
many of the issues previously discussed.26
In order to address these problems, international cooperation and
regulation is a must. This conclusion stems from the properties of
greenhouse gases (GHGs), the increased concentrations of which have
largely led to the increase in temperatures associated with climate change. 27
First, the effects of GHGs are global, meaning that carbon dioxide emitted
in one location will have the same effect on global climate change around
the world as would an emission from any other location.28 Secondly, most
GHGs remain in the atmosphere for decades or even longer and therefore
emissions have a cumulative effect.29 This effectively means that one
earth‘s average temperature will increase as much as three to eight degrees Fahrenheit in the
next century, causing polar ice caps to melt, sea levels to rise, wetlands to be destroyed, and
low-lying countries to be flooded); see also RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 391
(discussing the IPCC predictions that if we fail to reduce GHG emissions, temperatures will
likely rise by 3.2 to 7.2 degrees Fahrenheit between 2000 and 2100).
24. IPCC, supra note 14, at 46–47; see also RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 20, at
391 (Estimating that an increase in 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit is the threshold beyond which the
impacts of climate change are likely to be particularly grave due to the risks involved with
such an unstoppable feedback loop).
25. IPCC, supra note 14, at 46–47; see also RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 20, at
391 (Estimating that an increase in 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit is the threshold beyond which the
impacts of climate change are likely to be particularly grave due to the risks involved with
such an unstoppable feedback loop).
26. See generally IPCC, supra note 14 (predicting the potential effects of even slight
changes); see also WEINBERG & REILLY, supra note 22, at 427 (listing desertification,
increased storm intensity, and decreased crop yields as some of the most drastic effects
likely to result from even a few degrees increase in global temperature).
27. See IPCC, supra note 14, at 36–37 (detailing the ways in which GHGs cause the
observed changes in climate); see also GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 5 (Michael
G. Gerrard, ed., American Bar Association 2007) ("[T]he accumulation of certain gases in
the atmosphere traps some of the infrared radiation and prevents it from escaping. Instead,
the greenhouse gases absorb and re-radiate the heat. This warms the surface of the earth.
The more greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the more warming of the earth.").
28. See GERRARD, supra note 27, at 5 (finding that once emitted into the atmosphere,
GHGs travel the globe and have the same effect irrespective of where they originated).
29. See IPCC, supra note 14, at 46–47 ("Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise
would continue for centuries due to the time scales associated with climate processes and
feedbacks, even if GHG concentrations were to be stabilized."); see also GERRARD, supra
note 27, at 6 (stating that unlike many other air pollutants, GHGs do not have primarily local
or regional effects that are gone within weeks or months).
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nation alone, especially one of the larger emitters like the United States or
China,30 could emit enough GHGs to ensure massive global climate change
and all the negative implications that result, even if all other countries were
working together to mitigate these results.31 In other words, international
agreement and cooperation is essential to a meaningful solution. Thus far,
most attempts at international cooperation regarding climate change
regulation have been international conventions and treaties with limited
success.32
III.

National Sovereignty: The Building Block of International Law

Consideration of national sovereignty and the ability of states to
choose their own actions is central to an understanding of the tragedy of the
commons.
Absent national sovereignty, climate change could be
effectively addressed by some kind of top-down authority. Since such a
supranational regulatory authority might be successful in addressing climate
change, it is necessary to have a general understanding of why such a
system is not utilized.
A core component of international law provides that states are the
principal actors in world politics.33 In other words, states have national

30. See KEVIN A. BAUMERT, TIMOTHY HERZOG & JONATHAN PERSHING, NAVIGATING
NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY Fig. 3.1
(World Resources Institute 2005) (ranking the world‘s largest emitters, placing the United
States in first and China in second with 20.6% and 14.7% of the world‘s emissions
respectively).
31. See WOLD ET AL., supra note 18, at 127–28 (describing climate change as an
"inherently global issue" in which international cooperation is required).
32. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 31 INT‘L
LEGAL MATS 49 (1992), art. 2(a) (being the first such convention, signed by over one
hundred and ninety countries, including the United States); see also WEINBERG & REILLY,
supra note 22, at 427 (requiring that each signatory adopt national policies and take
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change by limiting the emissions of
greenhouse gases); RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 400 (reflecting the view of the
signatories that developed countries have greater historical responsibility and a greater
capacity to take action). In 1997, a second attempt known as the Kyoto Protocol where in
the aggregate, developed countries aimed at a 5 percent reduction from 1990 levels by the
first reporting period of 2008-2012. See WOLD ET AL., supra note 18, at 205 (discussing the
core of the Kyoto Protocol which focused on targets and timetables for GHG emissions and
the adoption of emissions trading, but also pointing to key implementation challenges). The
last of these conventions, known as the Copenhagen accord, exemplifies the most recent
international efforts to address global climate change. See FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE:
COPENHAGEN
ACCORD
(2009)
available
at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf. (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
33. See SHIRLEY V. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WORLD POLITICS: AN
INTRODUCTION 21–22 (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2004) (describing how a state must be
sovereign in order to belong to the international system of states).
THE
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sovereignty, and are not subject to international law absent their own
consent to be bound.34
The international legal order regulates the activities of an
international community comprising states, international
organisations, and non-governmental actors. States have the
primary role in the international legal order, both international
law-makers and holders of international rights and obligations . . .
The doctrine of sovereignty and equality of states has three
principal corollaries, namely that states have ‗(1) a jurisdiction,
prima facie exclusive, over a territory and a permanent population
there; (2) a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive
jurisdiction of other states; and (3) the dependence of obligations
arising from customary law and treaties on the consent of
obligor.‘35
In this way, statehood, or national sovereignty, is determined by
constitutional independence rather than international law.36
There are certain sweeping powers and rights generally recognized as
a result of national sovereignty including the following: the power to exert
authority over individuals living within the state‘s territory, the power to
use and dispose of territory under the state‘s jurisdiction and to perform
those activities deemed "necessary or beneficial" to the state‘s people, the
right that no other State intrude in the State‘s territory, the right to
immunity from jurisdiction of foreign courts for official acts of the State
and acts of the State‘s official representatives, and the right to respect for
life and property of the States nationals and State officials abroad.37
For the purpose of determining the failure of international
environmental law with regards to GHG emissions, national sovereignty

34. See WEINBERG & REILLY, supra note 22, at 424 (stating that absent enforceable
treaty provisions binding their action, nation states are sovereign within their own
jurisdiction, meaning that such states can only be bound if they themselves consent to such
limitations).
35. See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
VOLUME 1 FRAMEWORKS, STANDARDS, AND IMPLEMENTATION 15 (Manchester University
Press 1995) (detailing the international legal order according to the notion of sovereignty,
which gives states the sole right to develop policies and laws regarding the natural resources
within their territorial limits).
36. See SCOTT, supra note 33, at 22 ("‗Sovereignty in the relations between States
signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to
exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.‘" (citing a
statement by Max Huber in the Island of Palmas case)).
37. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 49–52 (Oxford University Press
2005) (2001) (listing the six basic rights and powers afforded to states with national
sovereignty).
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can be understood as giving states the ability to enter into relationships with
other states, which in effect also means that a state‘s choice in structuring
these relationships is not subject to scrutiny by international law.38
Historically, a claim to state sovereignty has been used by nations to exploit
resources outside a state‘s borders on a "first come, first served" basis.39
This state-centered understanding is problematic because compliance is
voluntary and an incentive to comply is thwarted by any perception that
noncompliance better serves a nation‘s interests.40
Ultimately, an international system centered on national sovereignty
means that states cannot be required to act, and relevant to the current
analysis, cannot be required by an overarching authority to regulate the
emissions of GHGs produced and emitted within their borders. Instead, for
meaningful climate change regulation to take effect, states must voluntarily
choose to adopt policies limiting emissions. For this reason, when and why
states enter into agreements becomes important to the determination of
whether international cooperation is possible and/or probable for climate
change regulation.
IV.

Implications of Sovereignty on State Decision Making

In spite of national sovereignty and the ability to make their own
independent decisions, states do in fact enter into agreements with other
states on a regular basis with the intent of binding the action of each.41
When they do so, they have nearly complete control over the content and
form of the deals they are striking.42 This is particularly true for the most
38. See SCOTT, supra note 33, at 22 (citing James H. Wolfe‘s assertion that while
international law can regulate between states it does not rise above them and therefore does
not truly bind them).
39. See BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT:
CREATING WEALTH IN HUMMINGBIRD ECONOMIES 2 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
1997) (discussing this phenomenon in terms of the "Commons Problem" and stating: "In the
simplest possible terms, common access or the commons problem relates to the absence of
exclusive rights. Nature‘s bounty is there for anyone whose presence on the commons
provides temporary control."). See also id. ("Even for people, all environmental problems,
indeed all problems of resources use, being with a commons and end with institutions that
affect environmental use.").
40. See SCOTT, supra note 33, at 22 ("The sovereign independence of a state gives it
the capacity to enter into relations with other states.‖); but see id. at 29 ("With the growth of
environmental, human rights, and humanitarian law the principle of noninterference in the
internal matters of a state is no longer absolute.")
41. See CASSESE, supra note 37, at 153–213 (laying out the various types of
international legal standards, including the role of custom, the formation of treaties, other
international law making processes, and the effect of jus cogens on the hierarchy of existing
rules).
42. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY 119 (Oxford University Press 2008) (emphasizing that due to state
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powerful states, which also happen to be the greatest GHG emitters.43
However, this alone does not explain why states are willing to cede
autonomy in favor of international cooperation and regulation. Many
principles of international law are customary in nature, stemming from
centuries old practices, including the idea that international agreements
shall be observed.44 This is because each nation receives some benefits
from international cooperation, law, and agreement.45
However, in order to reap these benefits, states must, to some extent,
give up their freedom to act as they so choose, thereby binding themselves
in ways they may not like in the future.46 Assuming that states employ
rational choice, this means that states will only enter into agreements when
they are better off, or in other words, where the benefits outweigh the
limitations.47 This assumption is one central to the study of international
relations. It is premised on the idea that absent an assumption of rational
choice, there is really nothing to study because any predictive power of the
discipline is gone. In this respect, the form, content, and extent of
international law will depend upon the homogeneity of the political system
and generally the degree of common interest held by nations worldwide,
meaning that an agreement will only be reached where every state is better
off with the agreement than with an alternative arrangement.48

sovereignty, international agreements range dramatically in terms of form, topic, and all
other conceivable aspects).
43. See BAUMERT ET AL., supra note 30, at Fig. 3.1 (ranking the world‘s largest
emitters, placing the United States in first and China in second with 20.6% and 14.7% of the
world‘s emissions respectively).
44. See Louis Henkin, The Politics of Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC
AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 17 (Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998) ("On
entering international society, new nations find these obligations (and corresponding rights)
upon them, and few purport to reject them . . . . [T]here has not been a major challenge to the
system of international law as a whole, to the bulk of its content, to its major norms.").
45. See id. at 18 (listing benefits of international law to individual states, including
order, stability, enhanced independence and security, getting other nations to behave in a
desired manner, avoiding the need to negotiate anew regularly, creating expectations, and
giving confidence in how other states will behave).
46. See Henkin, supra note 44, at 18 (explaining how each benefit of international
cooperation comes with a corresponding limitation on state action).
47. See GUZMAN, supra note 42, at 121 (justifying the assumption that rational choice
be used when looking at whether a state will enter into an agreement and showing that this
assumption implies that states will seek to maximize their own interests in any international
cooperation).
48. See Henkin, supra note 44, at 18 ("Nations may have ‗attitudes‘ in regard to the
desirability of extending the domain of law. At different times they see greater or less
interest in self-limitation and cooperation . . . . Nations differ in regard to how much
‗freedom‘ they are prepared to sacrifice for some common enterprise or to some
supranational institution."); see also GUZMAN, supra note 42, at 121 (arguing that where any
subset of parties to an agreement has a better alternative, they will take it).
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Often, as a result of the balance of interests required, states fail to
reach meaningful agreement and international regulation does not occur.
This is generally a result of the sovereign nature of states:
An international political system of sovereign states is inherently
‗laissez-faire,‘ resisting regulation by law.
Surely, norms
curtailing national autonomy in any important respect are not
likely to be adopted unless the need for them is commonly seen as
compelling and the result promises compensating advantage.
Often, the absence of control by international law is purposeful,
and many would say desirable . . . Even law commonly seen as
desirable, however, is prevented or delayed by the diffuse lawmaking process.49
This general preference favoring less regulation is often simple to surpass
in circumstances where cooperation is easy.50 On the other hand, in
situations where the parties‘ interests vary and goals conflict, an inability to
agree is commonplace.51
Generally, this means that agreement and cooperation are not
impossible goals. States can, and have, been able to reach agreement when
their behavior is restricted by the effects of their actions on reputation,
reciprocity, and retaliation.52 In other words, the result may vary because of
the need for a good reputation for compliance with international law, the
49. Henkin, supra note 44, at 22–23.
50. See GUZMAN, supra note 42, at 25–26 (distinguishing certain situations where state
can both seek their own self-interest and reach meaningful agreement with other states
because cooperation in those instances is both easy and valuable to each player).
51. This work chooses to use the tragedy of the commons as a means of understanding
international cooperation on GHG emissions. However, a more extensive study might
employ various game theories, including but not limited to the Prisoner‘s Dilemma. The
Prisoner‘s Dilemma is a commonly used game theory in which mutual cooperation of both
parties would yield the highest payout, but each party has an individual incentive to defect
regardless of what action the other party takes. See GUZMAN, supra note 42, at 30–31
(describing the aspects of the prisoner‘s dilemma as "a game in which the parties can
maximize their total joint payoff through mutual cooperation but each player does better by
defecting."). In a one-shot game, this scenario ensures that both sides will defect and
cooperation will fail. Id. at 32. While the typical prisoner‘s dilemma game involves only
two players, the basic premise can be extended to collective action problems because even
these interactions can often be reduced to a two-person game. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD,
ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 32 (Harvard
University Press 1994) (giving the examples of the choice to build or not build a levee in
which even though the problem is one of collective action, each of the various individuals
involved can be assigned to one of two positions). However, this analysis is beyond the
scope of this article, but remains an area for further exploration.
52. See GUZMAN, supra note 42, at 33–48 (finding that where repeated interactions
occurred between two states, they were often able to avoid the predicted outcome of the
prisoner‘s dilemma due to the incentives created by these three characteristics).
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possibility that a breach will result is a reciprocal breach by the other party,
and the threat of retaliation from the offended state.53 It is for these reasons
that various international agreements do exist, but where these factors are
lacking, it is unlikely that meaningful international cooperation will ever
result. Therefore, the basis for significant political action is an international
scientific consensus on the dimensions of the problem and the need for
cooperative solutions.54
This understanding of how and why states are able to agree in some
circumstances but fail to reach consensus in others is particularly important
with regards to the regulation of GHG emissions. GHGs create a tragedy of
the commons problem55 where international cooperation is necessary to
avoid overusing the global commons of the atmosphere and to prevent the
negative predictions that accompany climate change.56
V.

The Tragedy of the Commons and the Need for Agreement

The widespread emission of greenhouse gases generally creates a
tragedy of the commons problem.57 A tragedy of the commons occurs
when various actors share one common natural resource58—in this case the
atmosphere, or more generally, the environment.59 A commons generally
has three defining characteristics: (1) it is a domain or collectivity of
resources, such as the traditional English pasture or commons; (2) the
resource domain is accessible to various actors, each of which uses it for
individual benefit; and (3) the resources of the commons are both
53. See id. at 33–34 (describing the three Rs of Compliance).
54. See JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: A REGIME ANALYSIS 139 (John Wiley
& Sons Ltd. 1995) (giving the Montreal Protocol as an example where development was
possible because political action was grounded in a common scientific understanding).
55. Infra Part V.
56. Infra note 88.
57. While the tragedy of the commons was originally conceptualized at the local level,
the extreme differences of scale on the international global commons retain similarities to
the local level. In fact, equivalent problems and institutional principles can be found at both
levels. For this reason, the abundant evidence on the workings of small-scale commons can
be significant and insightful at the global level as well. See VOGLER, supra note 54, at 3
(justifying interchangeable use of the tragedy of the commons and global commons
analyses).
58. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 51, at 34 (depicting the original tragedy of the
commons scenario where shepherds that share a common pasture have an incentive to
overgraze because no individual shepherd incurs all the costs of adding an additional sheep
to the flock, but is able to realize all of the benefit).
59. The oldest recognized commons were the oceans. However, the recognized types
of commons frequently change as technology develops, the most obvious example being the
exploration of space. The atmosphere has become regarded as one of the most essential
commons for the survival of mankind in the modern age. See VOGLER, supra note 54, at 79 (specifying the various types of commons and the development of global commons issues
over time).
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subtractive and finite, meaning that what is taken by one actor is not
available to another and the total summation of resources is limited in
quantity and hence depletable.60 Due to the payouts associated with this
situation,61 the common resource will be depleted beyond the optimal point
for all users.62
For environmental laws to succeed in averting the tragedy of the
commons, they must be compatible with the laws of supply and demand
that occur naturally in the world.63
[A] fundamental cause of the environmental problem is that the
majority of resources in their natural state, such as water and air,
are ‗free‘ goods with a price of zero. That is, they are resources
that do not belong to any special individual but belong freely to
the whole community. As a result no special individual or
jurisdiction has any incentive to restrict the use or maintain the
quality of these common resources because he or she does not
have the right to realize a monetary return for doing so.64
This situation is often referred to as the global commons: the idea that
certain resources must have global management and be held in common for
the common use by all.65 The global commons are territories and resources
60. See MARVIN S. SOROOS, THE ENDANGERED ATMOSPHERE: PRESERVING A GLOBAL
COMMONS 210 (University of South Carolina Press 1997) (defining the key aspects of a
commons).
61. Id. at 208–09 (summarizing the theory of the tragedy of the commons where
individuals add cattle to a common pasture to increase personal profit, even to the point that
their aggregate herd exceeds the capacity the pasture can sustain, causing the overall value
of the pasture is decreased due to overcrowding); see also infra note 82 and accompanying
text (discussing the tragedy of the commons); Christopher C. Joyner, Global Commons: The
Oceans, Antarctica, the Atmosphere, and Outer Space, in MANAGING GLOBAL ISSUES:
LESSONS LEARNED 354, 356–57 (P.J. Simmons & Chantal de Jonge Oudraat eds., 2001)
(summarizing Hardin‘s traditional commons pasture).
62. See SOROOS, supra note 60, at 208 (quoting Aristotle to show the tendency for
shared resources to be overused and misused for generations of human society: "‗what is
common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Everybody thinks
chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest.‘").
63. See MIGUEL A. SANTOS, J.D., PH.D., LIMITS AND SCOPE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
47 (Charles Thomas Publisher 1995) ("Environmental laws that ignore natural laws, of
course, are scientifically irrelevant and bound to fail. It is counterproductive for an
environmental decision maker to enact laws that violate the laws of nature.")
64. Id. at 56.
65. See VED P. NANDA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 11
(Transnational Publishers 1995) (defining global commons as "areas ‗beyond the jurisdiction
and sovereignty of any state, but [which] exist for the common benefit of all‘ and usage of
which ‗physically affects human beings around the world.‘"); see also VOGLER, supra note
54, at 2 ("A commons is ‗a resource to which no single decision-making unit holds exclusive
title.‘").
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outside the jurisdiction of any one state, such as Antarctica, the atmosphere,
the oceans, or outer space.66 A commons is a "free-access area" where
individuals have unrestricted access and rights of use—in simplest terms,
the commons problem relates to the lack of exclusive rights to nature‘s
resources.67
The solution to the tragedy of the commons is and must be provided
by the state.68 When the problem is contained within a state‘s borders, such
local issues are within the jurisdiction of the state and that state‘s
government has the ability to control and regulate to advance the collective
interest.69 Because a global commons does not fall within the jurisdiction
of any one state, these alternatives are not readily available.70 However,
with technological advances and political pressure on the limited pool of
common resources, collective regulation becomes theoretically possible,
although highly improbable and limited.71
It is common to describe the atmosphere as a global commons even
though it differs from the high seas or outer space because it has at least

66. See NANDA, supra note 65, at 11 (listing various examples of resources historically
denoted as "commons" including high mountain pastures in Switzerland, village common
pastures in India, common grazing lands in colonial America and medieval England, Indian
and Spanish irrigation systems, and so on); see also VOGLER, supra note 54, at 6 ("Global
commons are areas beyond sovereign state jurisdiction. This may be because of the physical
impossibility of extending such control or as a consequence of an international
agreement . . . . The limits of the commons and even awareness of their existence has been
defined by the current state of exploration and technology."); Joyner, supra note 61, at 354
("Global common spaces are domains lying beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of any state
that states or their nationals may use for resource extraction, waste disposal, scientific
research, and so on.").
67. See YANDLE, supra note 39, at 2 (contending that the problem of the commons
exist as a result of the absence of exclusive rights to scarcely available resources and
evolutionary biology, which represents the struggle among peoples to access the important
sources of food, water, and shelter).
68. See VOGLER, supra note 54, at 16 ("When ‗commons‘ problems of pollution or
land use are essentially local in scope they will be within the jurisdiction of a state . . . and
there is, therefore, a government which at least has the potential to take control and regulate
in the collective interest.").
69. See id. (examining possible means of regulation for local problems where states
can limit user rights, define those rights, and enforce violations, taxes can be imposed on
damaging activities and alternatively, a state can employ enclosure, such as the English
pastoral commons).
70. Id. at 17.
71. See id. (giving an example where such pressures have created international
agreement—the Law of the Seas—but admitting that such systems are unusual, in large part
due to the essential difficulties that arise with regards to the use of common pool resources);
id. at 147 ("It is difficult not to strike an apocalyptic note when discussing climate change,
and present regime building efforts are meager indeed.")
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some overlap with territorial sovereignty.72 In this sense, it is often referred
to as the "common concern of mankind," thereby expressing the idea that
the preservation of the atmosphere is essential to our collective survival.73
Another alternative description is to deem the issue a common sink—the
use of the atmosphere as a sink for wastes.74 Irrespective of the specific
terminology employed, the atmosphere is accurately conceptualized as a
global commons because it is a natural resource domain that is essential to
human life and has been treated as an open-access resource, leaving
individuals the right to use it at will.75
However the problem is described, attempts at regulation of GHGs are
extremely difficult due to the sheer scale and difficulty of the greenhouse
gas effect when compared to other environmental issues that have seen
success at the international level in the past.76 While the "tragedy" of
overuse is not necessarily inevitable, the question becomes whether the
communities utilizing the commons can develop a management scheme that
restrains use to an acceptable level—a goal which has been most successful
at relatively small, community levels in which social pressures serve to
discourage destructive behavior.77
Indeed, many theorists have
pessimistically concluded that by the time global climate change regulation
is an achievable goal, climate changes will already be irreversible.78
As discussed above, the tragedy of the commons generally is that
common users have a tendency to overuse and exploit the resource domain
72. See id. at 124 (distinguishing between the high seas which are a common property
beyond the jurisdiction of any one state and the atmosphere which is at least related to the air
space above a state and therefore within the state‘s jurisdiction).
73. Id. at 124–25.
74. See Soroos, supra note 60, at 208 ("Humanity has long used the atmosphere as a
sink for many of its wastes with little awareness and concern for the ways it is being altered
or degraded.")
75. See id. at 213 (citing E.B. SOLNIKOFF, THE ELUSIVE TRANSFORMATION: SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 193 (Princeton University
Press) (1993)) (enumerating several examples of the ways in which humans utilize the
atmosphere for their survival).
76. See VOGLER, supra note 54, at 147 (differentiating ozone regulation from that of
GHG emissions on the theory that ozone depletion is more simplistic and easier to analyze
that GHGs—ozone depletion is easy to see and the causal link is more readily available).
77. See SOROOS, supra note 60, at 209 (limiting the ability of management schemes to
have meaningful control at the international level).
78. See VOGLER, supra note 54, at 147 ("Judging by the ozone experience, effective
public pressure on governments will probably only derive from clear and incontrovertible
evidence that global warming is actually occurring. The pessimistic conclusion is that . . . by
that time climate changes may already be irreversible."); see also PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN
BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 356 (Oxford
University Press 2009) ("The range and complexity of issues involved in global warming
and uncertainty regarding the nature, severity and timescale of possible climate effects make
the task of phasing out production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances seem
relatively simple by comparison.")
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to the point of overcrowding, depletion or destruction, and this "tragedy" is
already occurring for the atmosphere as the capacity of the global
atmosphere to absorb and disperse pollutants is continually exceeded due to
human activities.79 This happens even where the users of the commons are
aware of the harm and impending crisis they are causing.80 Because GHG
emissions have a global rather than just a regional effect, each individual
country has an incentive to emit more, thereby sharing the cost of such
emissions on the environment with all other nations but realizing all the
benefits regionally. In other words, pollutants attain two benefits from
releasing GHGs into the air even though they are aware of the negative
consequences of doing so: first, they receive the proceeds of the activity
that generates the GHGs and second, they retain savings from the easy
disposal of wastes that would otherwise be difficult to dispose of.81
The only way to avoid this outcome is for all players, in this case
nations that emit GHGs, to agree on the optimal point of usage at an
international rather than individual level. Today, the world is populated by
communities of people that have established rules for managing the
commons, at least to some extent.82 However, the past century has seen
increased degradation of the environment and the global commons have
been particularly threatened.83 In the last few decades there has been an
increased awareness among nation states that the global commons presents
a problem, and yet still reluctance to act remains widespread.84
In the case of GHG emissions particularly, universal agreement is
necessary because one large emitter has the capability of creating extensive
and long-lasting climate change even if all other states were to agree to
regulation.85 An analysis of the global commons problem implies that
climate change must be dealt with in a top-down manner because there are
generally two ways in which to avoid the "tragedy" of overuse:
79. SOROOS, supra note 60, at 221.
80. See id. at 221 ("Such behavior is the outgrowth of a rational assessment of selfinterested actors who calculate that all the proceeds from using the commons will go
exclusively to themselves as individual actors, while the environmental costs associated with
overgrazing will be shared with the entire community.").
81. See id. at 221–22 (finding that the share of the polluter‘s costs are much lower than
the value of the benefits he or she receives from the polluting activity).
82. See YANDLE, supra note 39, at 3–4, 6 (theorizing that the commons problem has
traditionally been solved in two ways: the process or systems approach—process refers to
the rules people set out for each other and follow often as a matter of custom; the systems
approach is more centralized and requires leaders to create and enforce rules).
83. See NANDA, supra note 65, at 25 (stating that the past century has seen massive
pollution of air and water, destruction of the world‘s rainforests, stratospheric ozone
depletion, and so on).
84. See id. at 25–26 (explaining this reluctance in large part as a result of sovereignty
and arguing that any meaningful environmental standards for the use of the global commons
must outrank sovereignty concerns for change to be effective).
85. IPCC, supra note 14, at 46–47.
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"privatization or the imposition of resource protection by an external
sovereign."86 To date, various strategies have been employed at the
international level to limit GHG emissions with varying degrees of success.
Generally, "[t]he effective management of the global commons is
brought about by state compliance with internationally agreed-upon
norms."87 These norms have traditionally come in two forms: treaties and
custom.88 Custom is generally characterized as a general practice and the
"conviction that such practice reflects, or amounts to, law . . . or is required
by social, economic, or political exigencies . . . ."89 Treaties on the other
hand, are usually written and represent the consent of two or more nations
to be bound by certain international rules.90 While each has an equal rank
and status, and the extent to which either creates a long-lasting, binding,
meaningful agreement is often questionable.91
The formation of
instruments for managing the global commons, including the regulation of
GHG emissions, has been significant, but the promulgation and
implementation of these agreements has been drastically lacking.92 In order
for any method to be successful, implementation, government compliance,
and consequences for noncompliance must be central to any regulatory
scheme.93
What this analysis means for the international regulation of GHG
emissions is twofold. First, to date, attempts at meaningful regulation have
failed to prevent the tragedy of the commons that results from the
widespread emission of GHGs.94 Second, due to the sovereign nature of
states, the ways in which states create agreements, and the inability of the
international community to reach an accord on climate change regulation,
86. See Katherine Trisolini & Jonathan Zasloff, Cities, Land Use, and the Global
Commons: Genesis and the Urban Politics of Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE
CHANGE 72, 72–74 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009) (introducing the
fundamental implications of the global commons issue for climate change regulation).
87. Joyner, supra note 61, at 365.
88. See CASSESE, supra note 37, at 153 (maintaining that states are generally bound by
either treaties or custom; treaties binding only those parties that sign on and custom binding
parties that do not object at the outset, thereby meaning that each type rests on consent).
89. Id. at 156.
90. See id. at 170 (including treaties, conventions, protocols, covenants, and acts as
types of agreements falling within this category, but specifying that such agreements only
serve to bind the signatories and hence have limited appeal where all nations fail to sign on).
91. See id. at 154 (arguing that States can elect to derivate from customary norms and
new norms could outrank treaties, thereby enabling parties to dispose of prior obligations by
mutual assent whenever their interests have changed).
92. See Joyner, supra note 61, at 365 ("The negotiation of instruments for managing
global commons areas has been notable and significant. Still, promulgation and even entry
into force of such agreements is not sufficient.").
93. See id. ("Implementation, government compliance, and reactions to
noncompliance are critical if the global commons are to be successfully managed and
conserved.").
94. Id.
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the future for international cooperation and consensus looks bleak.95
Whatever the world is doing is not working, and absent some change in
circumstances, it seems unlikely that a different result will magically occur
unless the methodology with which the problem is approached is
reformulated. The question then becomes how can the interactions of states
be altered or influenced in order to advance the goals of climate change
regulation.
VI.

The Need for the Adoption of a Theoretical Lens

Attempting to shape the interactions and agreements of sovereign
states, with an eye towards encouraging the development of climate change
regulation, requires a predictive mechanism of some kind. Therefore, to
anticipate the actions of states and the ways in which states will be affected,
one must first have an understanding of the basic nature of nations—a
concept that has been hotly debated and contested throughout history.
Indeed, the underlying characteristics and tendencies of states within the
international realm has been the center of scholarly research and debate
known as international relations theory.
International relations and international law academia have identified
and disseminated various understandings with regards to the basic nature
and tendencies of states. This has been done with the objective of
understanding why states act as they do within the confines of the
international system, with the underlying assumption being that there must
be some underlying theory or philosophy through which the relationships of
states can be viewed, dissected, and understood.96 Traditionally, legal
scholars have identified three such lenses: realism, liberalism, and
constructivism.97 This means that in order to change the interaction of
states with regards to climate change regulation, one must first adopt a lens
through which to examine state action. Of these, this note adopts the
constructivist lens for the reasons discussed below.98 Only then can a
prediction be made regarding what types of motivations, if any, will affect
the ultimate viability of meaningful cooperation for climate change.

95.
96.
97.

Id.
SCOTT, supra note 33, at 88.
See DAVID ARMSTRONG, THEO FARRELL & HELENE LAMBERT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 69–71 (Cambridge University Press 2007) (providing
an introduction to the three lenses of analyzing international relationships and international
law: realism, liberalism, and constructivism).
98. Infra Part VII.
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The Rejection of Liberalism and Realism

This section is meant to explain the general preference for a
constructivist lens, whose independent justification is laid out more
thoroughly in Part VIII. While the time and space limits of this note do not
allow for it, ideally one would address the implications for state action
under each of the three lenses. In this sense, this section is not meant to
rule out liberalism and realism as potentially helpful and insightful lenses,
but instead should be read as an explanation for the choice of one lens over
the use of two others where such a choice was necessary.
Constructivism is the newest of the three lenses99—realism and
idealism having longer roots in international relations scholarship.
Realism, as presented by Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Thucydides, presents
states as the only significant actors in world politics and argues that they are
rational actors within a competitive and anarchic international system
where each state will seek out its own best interests.100 Liberalism,
proposed in turn by Locke, Kant, and John Stuart Mill, focuses on norms,
regimes, and institutions, arguing that harmony, not war, was the natural
state of the international community.101
Both liberalism and realism have been rejected for the purposes of this
note: namely examining the possibility of international cooperation
regarding global climate change regulation. Liberalism has been generally
discredited following the occurrence of the two world wars of 1914–1918
and 1939–1945.102 Following the Cold War, liberalism returned to favor,
particularly through the work of Fukuyama who argued that liberal
democracy was the "‗final form of human government.‘"103 However,
within the last few decades, even Fukuyama has recognized the rise of
Islamic militancy as counter to his argument,104 and liberalist theories have

99. ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 97, at 69–70.
100. See id. at 72–74 (prioritizing the role of states and the material factors of
international existence such as military resources, the balance of power and so on over the
non-material factors such as social norms, institutions, and international law).
101. See id. at 69; see also id. at 83–87 (refuting realism by arguing that state are not
rational actors, but instead are vehicles for the views of individuals and purporting that states
can form interdependent ties); SCOTT BURCHILL, RICHARD DEVETAK, ANDREW LINKLATER,
MATTHEW PATERSON, CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT, & JACQUI TRUE, THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 55 (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) (1995) (describing liberalism as championing
democratic government, science, political freedom, and constitutionally guaranteed rights).
102. See ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 97, at 84–85 (giving examples refuting the
theory of liberalism, including the democratic election of Adolf Hitler and the failure of
democracy to bring a lasting peace).
103. See BURCHILL ET AL., supra note 101, at 56 (citing the theories of Fukuyama and
his belief that liberalism had proved itself the dominant international relations theory).
104. See id. at 57 ("The path of Western modernity in 2005 does not look as straight or
inevitable as it did a decade ago.").
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been largely disfavored with scholars turning instead to a constructivist
understanding of international relations.
Realism has likewise been rejected, because it provides little, if any,
hope for international cooperation with regards to climate change
regulation. Realism is criticized on various grounds, most notably on its
failure to recognize the importance of non-state actors such as multinational
corporations, banks, terrorists, international organizations, and so on.105
However, even if realism is the correct lens through which to view the
international world, the realist view of the international system, the role of
the state, and the balance of power politics, leaves almost no possibility for
any fundamental transformation of international politics absent violence.106
Therefore, any further analysis using this lens is less persuasive as it
implies that meaningful climate change regulation will never result from
mere discussion and compromise. For these reasons, the constructivist lens
is the intuitive choice and has been adopted initially on this rationale and
ultimately for the reasons discussed below.107
VIII.

Constructivism Justified

Constructivism, as discussed above,108 is the most applicable lens, for
the purposes and limitations of this work, available of the three leading
international relations theories. Constructivism stresses both normative and
ideational structures on the theory that both shape the social identities of
political actors.109 ―For constructivists, the material world of states and
rational action (the world of realists) only makes sense when located in the
social world that gives meaning to states as actors and defines what is
rational in given circumstances.‖110
Ultimately, what this means is that transnational actors and states have
interests and preferences that are not fully formed or unchanging, but
instead are ―constructed‖ by and through interactions with each other.111
State interests are defined in the context of internationally held
norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate.
105. PAUL R. VIOTTI & MARK V. KAUPPI, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY:
REALISM, PLURALISM, GLOBALISM, AND BEYOND 84 (Allyn & Bacon 1999) (1987).
106. See id. at 86 (explaining that realist stability is a world where weapons are a
necessity and changes are achieved through the use of violence and war—meaningful and
peaceful change is all but impossible).
107. Infra Part VIII.
108. Supra Part VII.
109. BURCHILL ET AL., supra note 101, at 196.
110. ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 97, at 70 (emphasis in original).
111. See OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 112 (Foundation Press 2005) (framing the various
discussions of constructivism).
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That normative context influences the behavior of decisionmakers
and of mass publics who may choose and constrain those
decisionmakers. The normative context also changes over time,
and as internationally held norms and values change, they create
coordinated shifts in state interests and behavior across the
system.112
Basically, constructivists believe, like realists, that state actors make
rational decisions, but unlike realists, constructivists believe that these
decisions are based on social construction.113 In this way, constructivism is
about the role of human consciousness in the international realm and
implies that international reality is built with ideational as well as material
blocks.114
Generally, the use of a constructivist lens is justifiable for a variety of
reasons. First, as discussed above, it is intuitively the most optimistic
match of the three primary international relations lenses.115 Second,
constructivism as a theory is well suited for the analysis of climate change.
Third, political relations theory, including constructivist thought, works
well with legal scholars and provides a theoretical basis upon which to
build legal action. Fourth, this lens is able to distinguish between climate
change regulation and the much more successful ozone agreements that
have developed. And, finally, constructivism is able to explain why cities
have adopted protective policies where other theories have failed to find an
explanation.
If climate change regulation is necessary and normatively good,
constructivism is an appropriate lens to adopt because it implies change is
possible.116 Just because a particular lens would tend to lead to the
conclusion that climate change regulation is a hopeless endeavor does not
mean that it is worthless—indeed an understanding of any such approach is
crucial when trying to determine whether climate change regulation is
112. Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, in FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 112, 113–14 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh
eds., 2005).
113. See VIOTTI & KAUPPI, supra note 105, at 217 ("Norms are constitutive, meaning
such concepts as ‗sovereignty‘ and ‗equality‘ are social constructions that help shape the
identities and interests of international actors. Hence, social constructivists argue that the
realist assumption of egoistic identities and treating state interests as givens is questionable;
these factors… instead [are] dependent variables . . . .")
114. John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism
and the Social Constructivist Challenge, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS 120, 125–26 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh eds., 2005).
115. Supra Part VII.
116. See HATHAWAY & KOH, supra note 111, at 112 (arguing that transnational actors
and their interests are not fully formed, but rather, are capable of being changed or
"constructed" through interaction).
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possible at all. However, for the purposes of this work, the goal is to
determine whether even our best chance of meaningful climate change
regulation leads one to conclude that such regulation is possible. In this
way, the constructivist lens will provide an understanding of the world‘s
best options it attempting to encourage international agreement.
The basic characteristics of constructivism as a theory are generally
compatible with the analysis of climate change regulation. A lens that
incorporates a sense of norms is particularly important with regards to
international cooperation analysis because at the international level, norms
are essentially the source of law.117 Therefore, any attempt to show how
actors‘ identities and interests, i.e. norms, are socially constructed is
particularly pertinent at the international level.118
Constructivism, as an international relations theory, is well suited as a
lens because of its general compatibility with legal scholarship. The law
and political science scholarship have a close relationship because one of
the functions of legal scholarship is to identify norms and rules at the
international level—a process that relies heavily on the work of political
scientists.119 "A constructivist approach in political science opens up
possibilities for conversation with international legal scholars that were
foreclosed under realist domination of [the] discipline."120 In this sense, an
international analysis of climate change regulation is connected to
constructivism in two primary ways. First, the nature of international legal
scholarship and constructivism are analytically similar in the sense that
each are looking for evidence that states share a common understanding
that certain principles are law by looking at state behavior, discourse, and
action.121 Second, both are interested in articulating and codifying norms
and laws that apply to states at the international level.122 For these reasons,
a political theory lens is applicable despite the fact that our analysis is one
of legal scholarship.
Perhaps most importantly, the adoption of a constructivist lens is
justified by its ability to explain the failures and successes of climate
117. See Finnemore, supra note 112, at 118 ("The notion that norms, understandings,
and discourse shape state behavior is hardly news to many outside political science.
International legal scholars have always known this: norms are their bread and butter. At the
international level norms are the law.")
118. See Ruggie, supra note 114, at 126 (describing how the basic tenets of
constructivism are well matched with the study of international relations, particularly by
interpreting the meaning actors attribute to certain situations).
119. See Finnemore, supra note 112, at 119 (relating international legal scholarship to
the constructivist study of norms, while acknowledging that scholarly writings have
historically been used as authoritative sources in the determination of international law).
120. Id. at 118.
121. See id. (contending that the means of showing a principle of law are similar to that
of establishing the existence of a norm).
122. Id. at 118–19.
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change regulation. This explanatory power lends legitimacy to the
constructivist lens and implies that an analysis from this viewpoint will
have the most predictive power.
International systems have universally been unable to develop
environment agreement and regulation with one exception: international
efforts to protect the stratospheric ozone layer.123 Part of this distinction
comes from the fact that when compared to climate change, ozone depletion
is a relatively simple problem, where scientific understanding and
replacement technologies abound.124 However, at least two legal scholars
believe that the success of ozone regulation is due to a combination of
various factors, including the impact of public pressure and the leadership
role played by the United States and other international institutions.125 This
legitimizes the constructivist claim that norms can be shaped, particularly
when outside parties exert pressure on a state, thereby influencing state
action.
Finally, the constructivist lens is validated by its ability to explain the
protective policies adopted by various U.S. cities, even where the tragedy of
the commons theory would predict that such initiative would fail to occur
because it is against the interests of the cities.126 An analysis of the
commons problem127 would usually suggest that local governments will fail
to address climate change, particularly where a federal mandate is lacking
as is the case in the U.S.128 However, when viewed through a constructivist
lens, this discrepancy is explained.

123. See Detlef Sprinz & Tapani Vaahtoranta, The Interest-based Explanation of
International Environmental Policy, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
251, 251 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh eds., 2005) (applying an interest-based
framework to explain when international environmental regulations will be supported based
on state preferences).
124. Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challenge for International Environment Law?, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND POLITICS 26 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh eds., 2005).
125. See Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, supra note 123, at 256 (listing six factors: a scientific
understand and consensus on the nature of ozone depletion, public pressure on decision
makers supporting such regulation, technological developments making regulation possible,
the leadership role of the United States, the role of the epistemic community, and the role of
international institutions).
126. See Trisolini, supra note 86, at 74 ("Yet, contrary to this tragic vision of resource
users, we observe an apparent movement among U.S. cities to tackle climate change even
when it appears to be against their immediate interest—at least as those interests have
traditionally been understood.").
127. Supra Part V.
128. See Trisolini & Zasloff, supra note 86, at 80–83 (asserting that it is unexpected
that cities in the U.S. would promote climate change regulations based on the expected
payouts of such actions).
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As described, constructivism posits that national interests can be
altered by interactions with other states and actors.129 In this sense, city
actions should be influenced by other actors within the greater system.
Thus, the politics of local climate change may be driven by
powerful advocacy networks whose origins lie far from the cities
in which they operate. Within this framework, national and
international environmental organizations raise the issue‘s
salience, propose specific actions, and command press attention,
making it useful—and at times necessary—for local politicians to
embrace the initiative.130
This analysis provides perhaps the best explanatory analysis of city action,
particularly with regards to the predictions of the tragedy of the commons.
For this reason and those listed above, a constructivist lens has been
adopted in order to examine how the interactions of states be altered or
influenced in order to advance the goals of climate change regulation.
IX.

A Constructivist Understanding: Where We Go from Here

In light of the preceding discussion, the interaction of state sovereignty
and the global commons problem of GHG emissions must be understood by
using a constructivist lens. In regards to climate change regulation, the lack
of any meaningful international governance system leaves state consent as
the only viable option for cooperation, and from our discussion, this method
clearly has severe limitations.131 However, a constructivist understanding
shows that the interests of a state flow from that state‘s conceptions of its
own identity.132 Therefore, one must conclude that meaningful climate
change regulation will only occur if states care about climate change at
more than just its face value—they must identify cooperation, regulation,
and the decrease of GHG emissions as an aspect of their own culture,
society, and self-identity in order for international agreement to abound.
For whatever reason, all states do not currently see climate change
regulation as an interest that they must pursue, as exemplified by the lack of
significant action at an international level on climate change. 133
Constructivism argues that this preference is not rigid or unchanging, but
129. See id. at 93 ("Constructivist international relations theory suggests that, by
producing a set of discursive practices that shape knowledge and ideas, international
interaction creates the international system itself.").
130. Id. at 94.
131. Bodansky, supra note 124, at 268
132. See ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 97, at 96 (giving the example that if a state
sees itself as a great world power, it will have an incentive to act like a great world power).
133. See generally supra Part II (discussing the lack of such action).
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instead can be molded and shaped for the future.134 The question then
becomes how this change can be encouraged, thereby giving the world a
chance at reaching meaningful agreement before it is too late.
There are three alternatives that intuitively leap to the forefront as
means of change for state interests, preferences, and understandings of
international norms. The first of these is to hope that change occurs
naturally, in its own time. This type of change, as constructivism teaches,
is possible, particularly as a result of state interactions with one another.
However, this process is slow moving and there is no guarantee that states
will head in a direction towards preferences that favor climate change
regulation.
The second possible means of change at the international level is to
wait until some crisis event creates a realignment of state interests. In our
case, this crisis would be severe climate change affecting the daily lives of
humans across the planet due to the continually increased GHG emissions
and lack of meaningful agreement. While such a crisis would undoubtedly
create state preferences in favor of regulation, it would be too little, too late.
As already discussed, GHGs have a "feedback loop" where at some point
the nature of the gases dictate that negative effects continue to abound for a
certain amount of time, regardless of measures taken to reduce current
emissions.135 This means that waiting for a crisis event to change state
preferences will fail to prevent the negative consequences predicted as a
result of GHG emissions.
The third and final alternative is for one or more nations to step
forward as a leader on climate change regulation in the hopes of shaping the
preferences and actions of other states through interactions within the
international realm. Constructivism points to such a conclusion and
suggests that this ability to influence the actions of other states has the
potential to create a top-down regulatory regime to deal with the global
commons problem.
Of the world‘s nations, the United States is particularly poised to step
forward as such a leader. If we as a nation are serious about protecting
against the dangers of climate change through international regulation, we
must begin to regulate GHG emissions within our own borders and call on
other nations to do the same. We must lead by example and hope that in
doing so, we are able to influence the behavior of other GHG emitting
states.
While this last option is the best alternative available, it too has severe
limitations. First, the process will be slow moving and faced with
resistance—particularly from developing countries and probably from
countries like China and India that are still rapidly expanding. Secondly,
134.
135.

Supra Part VIII.
See IPCC, supra note 14, at 46-47 (describing the feedback loop in detail).
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the attempts by the U.S. in the past aimed at affecting international identity
and state preferences have seen little success.136 There is certainly
significant doubt as to whether even this approach will be successful before
time runs out.
X.

Conclusion

The prospect of meaningful climate change regulation in time to
address the negative effects of GHG emissions is dismal at best. Of the
alternatives suggested by the above analysis only one seems truly plausible,
and even it implies a high likelihood of failure. The global commons
problem is one that requires a top-down approach when it comes to GHG
emissions, and the world is not in a place where such an agreement can be
reached. If a change in state preferences is something the world wants to
work towards, the best attempt at meaningful change is for one nation to
step forward as a climate change leader.
Of course this leaves open the question of whether any nation should
agree to take this action. In particular, the U.S. must look long and hard to
determine whether the costs of such a risky endeavor are something that it
should embrace. However, this cost-benefit analysis is a question for
another day. According to this analysis, one can be sure that the global
commons and national sovereignty make the regulation of GHG emissions
particularly difficult.
Top-down regulation is possible, using a
constructivist lens, but even with this understanding there are clear
limitations on the ability of change to occur within the necessary time
frame. The outlook for meaningful climate change regulation is dim, and
absent the strong leadership of one or more countries actively pushing
states to adopt such policies is undoubtedly hopeless.

136. See generally FRANCES FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN
(Free Press 1992) (suggesting that the advent of Western liberal democracy might be the
final stage in humanity‘s sociocultural evolution: "What we may be witnessing is not just
the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end
of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."); but
see generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS (Simon & Schuster
1996) (responding to Fukuyama‘s theory, with the idea that was eventually accepted
throughout the academic community, that democracy would not be the final say nationwide,
but instead that people‘s cultural and religious identities instead would dominate). The
United States‘ attempts at spreading democracy are an excellent example of why the United
States may be unable to meaningfully affect international identity. Today‘s world is far
from universally democratic and recent decades have seen a rise in other forms of
government, particularly in the Middle East where fundamentalist Islam has risen to
prominence.

